We study the relationship between pay gaps among top executives and firm value using the insights from a principal-agent framework. Large pay gaps on one hand reduce managerial shirking by imposing a large promotion incentive, and on the other hand they can induce counter-productive rivalries. Hence, both the pay gap level and its impact on firm value are jointly determined by the firm's optimizing pay gap so that the marginal benefit of reducing managerial moral hazard is balanced against the expected marginal costs of uncooperative manager behavior. We find that complex firms tend to have larger pay gaps, and their firm values increase with the pay gap level. On the other hand, R&D intensive firms tend to have lower pay gaps, and the effect of pay gaps on their firm value is much lower and can even become negative. We also find a substitution effect between pay gaps and other mechanisms used to control moral hazard problems. When strong corporate governance and high equity delta reduce managerial moral hazard, the marginal benefit of having a large pay gap declines significantly. Using the 2003 dividend tax cut as a quasi-natural experiment that exogenously increases effective managerial ownership, we find additional evidence reinforcing our primary findings, which provides further support for our main hypothesis.
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Introduction
The compensation of corporate CEOs has been studied extensively in the past two decades, but few studies have explored the compensation arrangements of other top executives or the pay distribution of the corporation's top executive team.
2 Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011) study the pay gap from corporate governance perspective, and they view the slice of CEO pay over the aggregate compensation of the top five executives as a manifestation of CEO power and document a negative relation between pay gap and firm performance. Aggarwal, Fu and Pan (2010) empirically test the bottom-up incentives (referred as internal governance) modeled in Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2010) , and they find a hump-shape relation between pay gap and firm investment. 3 Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) view the pay gap as an incentive mechanism to solve the moral hazard problem as modeled in Lazear and Rosen (1981) : large pay gap motivates non-CEO executives to work hard for promotion and reduces managerial shirking.
They find that firm value increases in pay gap. Thus, the effects of pay gap on firm value are currently in dispute.
In this study, we consider a neglected perspective in empirical studies-the collaboration among executives and the efficiency of management team production. Lazear (1989) points out that large pay gaps potentially undermine collaboration among senior executives and leads to value-destroying office politics and even conscious sabotage. More specifically, non-CEO executives may have incentives to devote effort in damaging their competitors' performance in order to inflate their own chances of being promoted to the CEO position, when the pay increase upon promotion is relatively high. Given the fact that the executive responsibilities are invariably shared and firm decisions embody the mutual agreement of the senior executive group, a properly designed incentive mechanism should minimize managerial moral hazard, while maximizing executive cooperation, so as to attain high overall management team productivity.
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We examine the pay gap through the lens of a simple principal-agent framework.
Modifying the Lazear (1989) model, we add governance mechanisms that mitigate the moral hazard problem, i.e. equity-based executive compensation. The principal in the corporate context is its shareholders and the agents are the CEO and two senior executives who are competing to be the next CEO. The pay gap derived from the model is jointly determined by the expected marginal benefit of improving managerial incentives by linking their chances of promotion to the effort they put in and the expected marginal cost of inducing counterproductive rivalries (sabotage) among senior executives. Sabotage refers to the general behavior that reduces coworker productivity while not improving one's own productivity. This stylized model also predicts that the pay gap level depends negatively on agents' equity deltas: the marginal benefit of having a large pay gap to lower moral hazard problems (including shirking) is reduced when other governance mechanisms exist to align manager and shareholder interests. In other words, equity-based incentives and corporate governance work as substitutes for a large pay gap. We then examine the relationship between pay gap and firm value. Our model clearly indicates that the effect of pay gap on firm output is a function of the parameters that capture key firm and executive characteristics. More specifically, the effect of pay gap on firm output is larger when the marginal benefit of reducing manager moral hazard problems is large, such as when managers have higher marginal productivity of effort. On the other hand, the effect of pay gap on firm output is reduced by the damage caused by counter-productive executive rivalries. The effect of pay gap on firm output is also found to fall when a firm's equity returns is riskier.
Using data on executive compensation for US public firms from 1996 to 2005, 4 we find strong support for the predictions derived from our model. The pay gap is larger when managerial moral hazard problems are more severe, and the pay gap is smaller when the expected cost of counter-productive executive rivalries is more serious. Examining the relationship between pay gap and firm performance, we find that the effect of pay gap on firm performance is significantly positive when the firm has greater manager-shareholder agency conflicts, creating a large managerial moral hazard problem. On the other hand, the effect of pay gap on firm performance is greatly diminished and can even be negative, when managerial shirking concerns are small, while improving collaboration and management team productivity is 3 a first order of magnitude issue. These relationships provide evidence that the pay gap's impact on firm performance is not uniform across all firms. Instead, this relationship is largely conditional on firm characteristics.
We measure the pay gap among top executives as the logarithm of dollar difference between CEO's total compensation and the median total compensation of non-CEO executives that are reported in a firm's proxy statement. We evaluate firm value by looking at its industryadjusted Q, both in the immediate future (a year ahead) and longer term (three years ahead).
Examining the univariate statistics on the pay gap, we document several noteworthy findings.
First, substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity exists in firm pay gaps, which is highlighted by a bottom quartile pay gap of $542,423, compare to that in the top quartile of $3,427,720. 5 The pay gap rises over our sample period, with the median pay gap rising from $935,530 in 1996 to $1,948,430 in 2005. Alternatively, we use the CPS (CEO pay slice constructed by Bebchuk et al 2011) to measure pay gap. It is measured by the ratio of the CEO total compensation over the aggregate compensation of the top five executives. We also find an upward trend over time using this measure.
Second, pay gap is highly firm specific, with firm fixed effects explaining more than half of the cross-sectional variation. Pay gap is also strongly correlated with firm level characteristics.
Large firms have significantly larger pay gap than otherwise similar firms. This is consistent with several model predictions. Large firms tend to be more difficult to monitor and can have more severe moral hazard problems, which calls for a higher pay gap to provide additional incentives. Moreover, marginal productivity of executive effort increases with firm size and complexity (i.e. Rosen 1981 , Rosen 1982 , Gabaix and Landier 2008 , and our model predicts a positive relation between marginal productivity of executive effort and pay gap. We also find that pay gap rises as firms become risker, which is consistent with the idea that high risk firms are more difficult to monitor and hence face larger managerial moral hazard problems. On the other hand, pay gap declines as managerial moral hazard becomes less of a concern. For example, the pay gap is lower, when either firm corporate governance is strong or non-CEO top executive financial interests are better aligned with shareholders through a higher equity delta.
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One of our hypotheses is that pay gap should be smaller when team production is critical to firm performance and when reducing counter-productive sabotage is a top priority. Siegel and Hambrick (2005) argue that top management collaboration is particularly important in technology-intensive firms, because of the substantial amount of information processing required and the need for frequent reassessments and adjustments in corporate strategies in the face of a rapid changing marketplace. 6 We find that pay gap decreases with R&D expenditures only when overall firm corporate governance is strong. When both managerial moral hazard and expected costs of competing manager sabotage are of major concern, a higher pay gap can be expected.
The third set of findings uncovers a relationship between pay gap and firm performance.
The effect of pay gap on industry adjusted Tobin's Q averaged over the full sample is negative, but it is not statistically significant. In contrast to Aggarwal et al (2010), we do not find a humpshape relation using our pay gap measure. Neither does the effect of the pay gap-firm performance relationship depend on whether the large pay gap is due to high CEO compensation or low non-CEO executive compensation. In fact, we find that the pay gap-firm performance relationship is conditional on firm characteristics. The effect of pay gap on firm performance is positive and significant when monitoring costs are higher and managerial moral hazard is potentially more serious. For instance, the pay gap increases industry-adjusted Q significantly in large, complex firms, suggesting that such firms benefit more from having a larger pay gap. On the other hand, the marginal effect of pay gap on industry-adjusted Q declines and even becomes negative, as the level of managerial moral hazard falls. We find that pay gap has a significant negative correlation with firm performance in firms with strong corporate governance and a higher median non-CEO executive equity delta.
The relation between pay gap and firm performance also depends on how harmful employee sabotage is likely to be for firm performance. Our model predicts a low pay gap level and a low pay gap-firm performance relationship when team production is important and the expected cost of employee sabotage is large. We find that the coefficient on pay gap significantly 5 falls with firm technology-intensity, measured by R&D expenses over total assets. We also find that the marginal effect of pay gap on industry-adjusted Q declines with firm risk, measured by volatility of stock returns, with an effect that is statistically significant at 1 percent level. This result complements the findings in Bloom and Michel (2002) , who document that a large pay gap is associated with higher management turnover and shorter manager tenure and that this impact is exacerbated under more volatile operating conditions.
We use a quasi-natural experiment as our first approach to testing causality between pay gap and firm performance. The exogenous event we use as a quasi-natural experiment is the Bush Administration's 2003 Dividend Tax Cut. Chetty and Saez (2010) and Chetty and Saez (2005) theoretically and empirically show that dividend tax cut increases managers' after-tax wealth obtained from their equity holdings and hence effectively it increases the sensitivity of managerial wealth to firm value. This exogenous tax reform legislation results in improved alignment of manager interests with shareholders and reduces the managerial moral hazard problem. Consequently, the benefit of having a large pay gap in order to reduce the managerial moral hazard problem becomes less attractive. Therefore, we expect firms to reduce their pay gaps following the dividend tax cut in 2003, and the effect of pay gap level on firm value should also decrease after the tax cut. Indeed, we find that on average the pay gap declines significantly after the tax reform, controlling for other firm characteristics and a time trend. The magnitude of the pay gap drop is especially large for firms having high managerial ownership and paying out dividends regularly prior to the tax reform. Furthermore, we find the pay gap effect on firm value also falls after 2003 and the reduction is especially large for riskier and more R&D intensive firms.
We also use a conventional IV-GMM approach to address potential endogeneity to further establish the causality of the pay gap-firm performance relationship. The exogenous instrumental variables for the pay gap are the industry's median pay gap level and the number of internal CEO successions by industry firms over the prior year. A firm's pay gap is highly correlated with industry pay gap since many firms tend to benchmark to industry peers in setting executive compensation. Furthermore, industry trends concerning hiring internal CEO candidates can significantly influence CEO succession decisions of other firms within the industry, and hence affect a firm's pay gap level. However, economically, there is no clear reason to expect 6 these two industry specific variables to be directly related to an individual firm's industryadjusted Q. Formal statistical tests, including Hansen's J statistic and the Cragg-Donald Wald test, indicate that the two instrumental variables both meet the exclusion and relevance requirements for statistically valid IVs. Importantly, we find that our main findings regarding the relationship between pay gap and firm value continue to hold under the IV-GMM specifications.
Our paper is organized as follows. We present a simple model in Section 2 to motivate our empirical analysis. The data and sample construction are presented in section 3. We report our primary empirical evidence in section 4. The quasi-natural experiment using 2003 tax cut is presented in section 5. We report our robustness tests in section 6 and conclude in section 7.
Model
We adopt a simple model to illustrate how the choice of pay gap level reflects a tradeoff between the benefit of reducing managerial moral hazard and the expected cost of inducing lower level employee sabotage. Our model is similar to the framework in Lazear (1989), with our primary innovation being the inclusion of other incentive mechanisms to help align manager interests with those of shareholders. We emphasize the purpose of this model is purely to illustrate the relationship that inspires the later empirical tests, rather than to identify a specific structural equation system.
Consider two agents j and k who are competing to become the next CEO. The agent's productivity ( , ) q  is a positive function of his/her own effort  , and is a negative function of the rival's sabotage activity  . The agent also bears a cost ( , ) c  , which is a positive function of the agent's individual effort to improve productivity and to sabotage the rival. The firm's output Q depends on the collective effort and sabotage levels of the two agents:
(1) w if he/ she wins promotion, otherwise the agent receives a pay package of 2 w if he/she loses the competition and stays on the current position or is forced to leave the firm and search for another position. The agent cares about his/ her total pay less the costs involved, and has exponential utility with constant absolute risk aversion  . The agent j then maximizes
The promotion probability p depends not only on an agent's own productivity, but also on that of its rival and it indirectly depends on the two agents' sabotage activities. This is formally stated as ,,
where G is the distribution function of the random variable kj   , the random shocks on firm production and the agents' idiosyncratic production. 
Substituting (5a) and (5b) back into (1), we obtain the relationship between firm output Q and the pay gap level   . Moreover, when managerial interests are better align with those of principals through other governance arrangements, the moral hazard problem is less severe, and the benefit of the pay gap 9 is lower. Hence, the optimal pay gap decreases with the quality of the firm's corporate governance and the managers' equity delta. Thus, the optimal pay gap is highly firm specific.
Given this analysis, we form the following hypotheses:
1.
/0     . Pay gap increases in a manager's marginal productivity of effort. Hence, pay gap should be larger in large and more complex firms, because a manager's marginal productivity of effort is high in such firms (i.e. Rosen (1982) , Gabaix and Landier (2008) The effect of pay gap on firm value decreases in the expected damage associated with agent sabotage. Therefore, we expect the effect of pay gap on firm value to fall with the level of R&D intensity, which requires greater agent cooperation.
7.
/0 Q     The effect of pay gap on firm value also falls with rising firm risk.
Data and Sample Description
Data source
We obtain top executive officer names and compensation data from Compustat's 
Variable definition
The pay gap is measured as the difference in total compensation between the CEO and median total compensation of the other top executives who are reported in the proxy statements.
We then scale the difference by taking the natural logarithm. Following Kale et al (2009) , for cases where a CEO's total compensation is less than the median non-CEO executive's total compensation, which results in a negative pay gap, we monotonically transform all observations by adding a constant equal to the absolute value of the minimum gap to each observation. The pay gap measure is based on the total compensation of each of these top executives, including salary, bonus, other annual pay, the market value of restricted stock granted that year, the BlackScholes value of stock options granted that year, long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation elements (as reported in Execucomp item TDC1). The sample mean and median 11 of pay gap is $3,023,210 and $1,380,640, respectively, and we observe a large cross-sectional variation. The bottom quartile of pay gap is $542,424 and the top quartile is $3,427,720.
Meanwhile, there is a significant upward trend over time as shown in Figure 1 . The median pay gap is $935,530 in 1996 and it increases to $1,948,430. We also use several alternative pay gap measures, including the CPS (CEO pay slice) studied by Bebchuk et al 2011, the coefficient of variation of the total compensation for the top executives and the Gini coefficient of total compensation among the top executives. We find a similar upward trend over our sample period when we use these alternative measures 8 . These alternative pay gap measures have a significant positive correlation with firm value, although they are far from perfectly correlated.
We measure firm value using Tobin's Q, approximated by book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, all divided by book value of assets. Each firm's Tobin's Q measure is industry adjusted by subtracting the industry median Q, where the industry is defined by FF 49 industries using the Compustat Universe (excluding the firm in question).
We examine both industry adjusted Q at year (t+1) (termed the one-year adjusted Q) and the average industry adjusted Q over the next three years (termed the three-year adjusted Q). The median one-year adjusted Q and three-year adjusted Q are 0.128 and 0.125, respectively.
We evaluate the overall strength of corporate governance based on five dimensions: (1) board composition and board monitoring; (2) blockholder monitoring; (3) anti-takeover provisions that measure the strength of the market for corporate control; (4) a CEO's formal positions and power inside the firm; (5) industry competition. To be specific, (1) includes board size (median=9), percentage of independent directors (median=0.66), percentage of busy independent directors, measured by directors who serve on more than three boards (mean=0.1, median=0). For (2), we use an indicator for when an independent blockholder is represented on the board (frequency=0.10). 9 For (3), we use the entrenchment index (E index) of Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell (2009) (median=2). For (4), we use an indicator for CEO-chair duality 8 CPS is the ratio of CEO total compensation over the aggregate total compensation of all top 5 executives. Coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of total compensation for all top executives divided by the mean value of total compensation for all top executives. The equation to calculate Gini coefficient is:
where P is the rank of total compensation and X is the amount of total compensation for person i. The median firm in our sample has total assets of $1157 million dollars and operates in two business segments. Firms operating in multiple business segments and with above-median size are regarded as complex in the nature of its business and organizational structure, in contrast to small firms operating in single segment, which is similar to the definition used in Coles et al (2008) . Technology-intensity is captured by a firm's investment in R&D activities. We define firms that have R&D to total assets ratio greater than or equal to the 75 percentile level (R&D/ total assets=0.04) to be technology-intensive. Note that the R&D intensity of the sample firms is highly right skewed. We assess firm risk by looking at its stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of its 60-month stock returns over the past five years. 10 The sample mean and median of stock return volatility is 0.13 and 0.11, respectively. We measure an executive's alignment of interest with shareholders using the executive's equity delta, which is defined as the dollar change in his or her accumulated stock and option portfolios for a 1% change in stock price, following the approach of Core and Guay (2002) . Haubrich (1994) , Hall and Liebman
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(1998), and Core and Guay (1999) argue that a wealth-constrained and risk-averse manager can obtain powerful incentives from a large dollar equity portfolio. Our sample of CEOs has an median equity delta of $256,199, while the median non-CEO executive's equity delta is substantially lower with a median of $25,233. We report the sample statistics in Table 1 and all continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile levels.
Negative pay gap
Sometimes, the CEO is paid less than the median level of the non-CEO top executives and this difference leads to a negative pay gap. About 5.34% of our firm-year observations (892 out of 16699) have a negative pay gap. Some firms only have negative pay gap occasionally, while some firms persistently have CEO paid less than other top executives, i.e. Franklin
Resources, Southwest Airlines, Safeguard Scientifics, Biomet, and etc. Table 3 
Empirical Results
The level of pay gap and firm characteristics
We first examine the relationship of pay gap and firm characteristics. We find that pay gap is highly firm-specific and it is significantly correlated with factors reflecting the marginal benefit of managerial effort and the marginal costs of rival manager sabotage. The results in column one of Table 4 shows that firm size has a significant positive correlation with pay gap, consistent with the prediction that pay gap should increase with a manager's marginal productivity of effort. The pay gap is negatively correlated with other top executives' median equity delta and the coefficient is statistically significant at 1 percent level, suggesting that when non-CEO top executive incentives are better aligned with shareholder interests, a lower pay gap is optimal. Similarly, we find pay gap decreases with the firm's corporate governance score, suggesting that when the overall corporate governance is strong enough to substantially lower manager-shareholder agency problems, the benefit of having large pay gaps is also reduced. This result is also in line with argument in Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2010) that internal incentives can substitute for other corporate governance mechanisms. Consistent with our prediction (4), we find that pay gap increases with firm risk. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that pay gap is related to firm R&D level in any significant way, which stands in contrast with the prediction that high technology-intensive firms that bear large costs of productivity-reducing competing manager sabotage should have low pay gaps. One possible reason is that although high-tech firms generally suffer greatly from uncooperative rival competition, they are also generally hard to monitor due to their high technology-intensity, which requires larger pay gap to control for a potential manager moral hazard problem. Therefore, we further examine whether high-tech firms significantly reduce pay gap when the overall corporate governance mechanisms are strong enough to control managerial moral hazard. As predicted, this is indeed what we find: pay gap is negatively related to R&D intensity when moral hazard is kept low by strong corporate governance, thus causing managerial collaboration to be a priority for these firms.
Our results from using indicator variables in place of continuous variables are similar to the regression results in column one. We find that large and complex firms have larger pay gaps than small and single segment firms. High risk firms also have significantly larger pay gaps than low risk firms. Firms with above-median equity deltas for non-CEO executives have an average 6 percent lower pay gap than firms with non-CEO executive equity deltas below the sample median. Firms with strong corporate governance have an average pay gap that is 12 percent lowers than firms with weak governance.
Pay gap level and firm value
We next test the effect of pay gaps on firm value measured by one-year and three-year industry-adjusted Tobin's Qs. Since firms could have large pay gaps either because CEO pay is very high or non-CEO manager pay is relatively low, we test if the pay gap-firm performance relationship depends on the source of the large pay gap. We first estimate the abnormal CEO pay using the residual from regressing total CEO compensation on firm size, market to book ratio, year and industry fixed effects. The abnormal compensation for median non-CEOs is calculated in the same way. We observe that 42.35% of firm-year observations have positive abnormal CEO compensation, while 59.22% of firm-year observations have negative abnormal median non-CEO compensation. We then interact the pay gap with an indicator for positive CEO abnormal pay and an indicator for negative non-CEO abnormal pay in model 4 and model 8 of Table 5 . Once again, we find statistically insignificant relationship between pay gap and firm performance. Furthermore, the relationship is not related to whether CEO pay is too high or non-CEO pay is too low.
Our hypotheses in section 2 suggest that the relationship between pay gap and firm value relies on the marginal benefit of reducing managerial moral hazard, which is closely related to manager marginal productivity. Following this logic, we test the effect of pay gap on firm performance conditional on firm complexity. As modeled in Rosen (1982) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) , marginal productivity of manager effort increases with firm size and complexity.
We test prediction (5) by interacting pay gap with a complex-firm indicator, with the results reported in Table 6 . Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a significant positive coefficient on the interaction term in both the one-year and three-year industry-adjusted Q regressions, suggesting that complex firms reap greater benefits from having larger pay gaps. The effect of pay gap on firm performance also depends on the severity of a firm's moral hazard problem. In firms where strong corporate governance tightly limits the moral hazard problem, the marginal benefit of reducing CEO moral hazard is lower and so is the benefit of raising pay gap on firm value. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the marginal effect of pay gap on firm value significantly falls with the overall strength of a firm's corporate governance. The magnitude is economically large: the marginal effect of pay gap on one-year industry adjusted Q falls by 70%
if the firm's corporate governance moves from the bottom quartile to the top quartile, while the marginal effect of pay gap on three-year industry adjusted Q becomes negative when a firm's corporate governance index is in the top quartile. Similarly, we find that the marginal benefit of having a large pay gap to improve managerial incentives and hence raise firm value is greatly reduced when non-CEO executives have high equity deltas. The marginal effect of pay gap on three-year industry adjusted Q falls from a significantly positive to a significantly negative coefficient, if non-CEO executive equity deltas move from the bottom quartile to the top quartile for our sample.
We test hypothesis 6 by interacting pay gap with R&D intensity. Consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of pay gap on firm value decreases with the potential cost of competing manager rivalry, we find that the coefficient on the interaction of pay gap and R&D intensity is negative and significant. The marginal effect of pay gap on one-year adjusted Q is 84 percent lower for high R&D-intensity firms than for firms without significant R&D expenditures. The coefficient of pay gap in the firm value regressions also depends on firm riskiness. Specifically, the estimates in the last two columns of Table 6 indicate that the marginal effect of pay gap on firm value significantly falls as firm risk increases. The coefficient of pay gap is 0.038 for firms in the bottom quartile of stock return volatility, compared to -0.014 for firms in the top quartile.
This is strongly consistent with prediction (7) that riskier firms suffer more from large pay gaps.
Our result complements the findings in Bloom and Michel (2002) , which documents that large pay gaps are associated with higher manager turnover and shorter manager tenure, and this impact can be intensified under more volatile operating conditions.
Predicted pay gap and firm value
We test the relation between pay gap and firm value in Table 7 using the fitted value for pay gap. The reason for using predicted pay gap instead of the actual level is that the actual pay gap can be affected by random shocks from time to time and hence, the relationship we document in Table 6 could be spuriously driven by those random shocks. Using fitted values helps to control for the effects from these random shocks.
Our results remain the same under this specification. Predicted pay gap significantly reduces firm value in small and single segment firms, while it significantly increases firm value in large, multi-segment firms (conglomerates). The positive effect of predicted pay gap on firm value significantly falls if overall corporate governance is strong or if non-CEO top executives have high equity deltas. The effect of predicted pay gap on firm value even becomes negative if the firm has a corporate governance score above 0.5 or the median non-CEO top executive has an equity delta that is high enough (above the 95 percentile of the sample). The effect of predicted pay gap on industry-adjusted Q also falls with R&D intensity, and its effect is reduced by almost 70% if a firm with no material R&D expenditures begins to invest heavily in R&D and moves its R&D intensity level to the top quartile of the sample (R&D/total assets= 0.04).
Similarly, the positive effect of predicted pay gap on firm value also falls significantly as a firm's risk level rises.
2003 Tax Reform as a Quasi-Natural Experiment
The impact of dividend tax cut
The Jobs and Growth Tax . Assuming the manager holds α percent of the firm's total shares outstanding, the manger's pay has the following structure:
The manager's effective ownership stake (1 ) depending on whether the initial investment I is at the first-best level. Moreover, large shareholders also effectively have larger shareholdings after the dividend tax cut that encourage them to monitor managers more closely, which reduces the agency problems further.
The change of the pay gap level
We expect a decrease in pay gap following the 2003 tax cut, because the marginal benefit of having a large pay gap is reduced due to the increase in effective managerial ownership. R&D. In addition, high risk firms cut their pay gaps more aggressively than low risk firms. We then examine the changes in pay gaps based on a firms' dividend payout status. We investigate firms that do not pay a dividend over the whole sample period, firms that pay out dividends over the entire sample period, and firms that start to pay dividends after 2003. We find that firms that initiated dividend payouts after 2003 cut their pay gaps most significantly, suggesting that these firms' behavior was affected most by the tax cut.
We next formally test whether the average change in pay gaps occurs after the 2003 dividend tax cut using the following specification:
where post is defined as an indicator variable for the post-tax-cut 2003-2005 period, t-2003 captures the time-series trend, and X it is a vector of firm level controls. We also include firm fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant firm level factors. Table 8 (9) further suggests that firms most affected by the tax reform are those having higher managerial stock ownership ()  and paying out dividends (D>0). Hence, we test whether these firms tend to cut their pay gaps more than other firms. The three-way interaction term of the post-tax reform indicator, CEO's aggregate shareholding as a percentage of total shares outstanding (CEO ownership) and a firm's dividend payout status prior to the tax reform in column 4 of Table 8 is negative and significant at the one percent level. This is consistent with the prediction that firms that pay out dividend and have CEOs with large ownership positions respond to the tax reform more strongly than other firms and cut their pay gap more aggressively.
In unreported regressions, we find that such firms reduce their pay gaps by cutting CEO compensation more aggressively than cutting median non-CEO compensation, relative to the remaining firms. In column 5, we replace CEO ownership with median non-CEO executive ownership, and the three-way interaction term is also negative, suggesting that when non-CEO top executives have larger ownership positions in dividend-paying firms, these firms also cut their pay gaps more aggressively, but the effect is not statistically significant. Finally, we look at the ownership difference between the CEO and median non-CEO top executive and interact it with an indicator for a firm's dividend payout status in column 6. We find that firms having a large ownership differences between the CEO and other top executives and regularly paying cash dividends prior to the tax reform reduce their pay gap significantly more than other firms.
We next examine whether the magnitude of the pay gap reduction is conditional on firm characteristics by estimating the following regression model: the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, the difference in pay gap reductions by firms with good and bad corporate governance is not statistically significant. We also look at the 21 average change of the pay gap based on firm dividend payout status. Without taking into account the level of managerial ownership, we find no significant difference in the pay gap changes of dividend and non-dividend paying firms. When we use the predicted probability of paying a cash dividend, instead of the firm's actual dividend payout status, 13 we find no evidence suggesting that changes of pay gaps around the 2003 tax reform is related to the dividend payout propensity.
The relation between pay gap and firm value before and after tax cut
In this section, we examine whether the effect of pay gaps on firm performance changes after an exogenous rise in effective managerial ownership caused by the 2003 dividend tax cut.
Managers have greater incentives to put in more effort after the dividend tax reform act because their wealth is more closely tied to firm value after the exogenous increase in their share ownership. Meanwhile, for the same reason, managers are less willing to sabotage their colleagues, everything else being equal. Thus, we expect firm value to increase after the tax cut.
Moreover, the marginal effect of the pay gap on motivating executives to put in more effort and thereby reducing moral hazard declines, because the marginal productivity of effort falls with the level of effort, but the marginal cost of effort increases with the level of effort. Therefore, we expect the marginal effect of pay gap on firm value to decline after the 2003 tax reform act, relative to the pre-tax-cut period. We formally test this prediction by estimating the following regression:
[ log( _ ) 
The results are reported in Table 9 . We find that 1  is positive and statistically insignificant, consistent with our findings in Table 5 that on average pay gap does not have a significant impact on firm value. 1
 is negative and statistically significant and 11 0   , suggesting that a larger pay gap reduces firm value after the 2003 tax reform, and the impact is statistically significant. This is consistent with our prediction that the marginal effect of pay gap 13 The probability of paying out dividends is estimated using a logistic model following Denis and Osobov (2008) . Specifically, the independent variables are firm size measured by logarithm of total assets, market to book ratio, percentage change of total assets, retained earnings/book value of equity and EBIT/total assets. The independent variables are measured at one year before the dividends are paid out.
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declines after an exogenous increase in managerial ownership. 2  is significantly positively, consistent with our prediction that firm value on average increases after the dividend tax cut.
We next use a difference-in-difference approach and compare the changes in pay gap coefficients across firms with different characteristics. Specifically, we compare complex versus simple firms, high versus low R&D intensity firms, high versus low risk firms, and good versus bad governance firms. Formally, the regression specification is as follows: 
The coefficient 2  shows us the average change in the pay gap effects for high minus low-type firms. The results are reported in the Table 9 . While the effect of pay gap on firm value generally falls after the tax reform ( 1 0   ), there is significant cross-group heterogeneity. Complex firms experience a much smaller decline in the marginal effect of pay gap relative to simple firms ( 2 0   ). On the other hand, high-risk firms and high-tech firms have a much larger decline in the pay gap effect on firm value, compared to low-risk firms and low R&D intensity firms respectively ( 2 0   ). Similarly, the decline in the marginal effect of the pay gap after the tax reform is also larger for well-governed firms compared to weakly-governed firms ( 2 0   ).
These cross-group comparisons are all statistically significant.
The unexpected dividend tax cut provides us with a quasi-natural experiment which gives us new insights into how firms adjust senior manager financial incentives in the face of an exogenous change in the contracting environment. We find that firms appear to respond to such changes by adjusting their executive compensation arrangements to take into account the changing incentives due to taxes. Moreover, the effect of one incentive mechanism on improving firm value becomes weaker if other incentive mechanisms are reinforced by changes in government regulatory or tax policies.
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Instrumental variable regressions using GMM
Our quasi-natural experiment presented in section 5 is one approach to controlling for endogeneity in our results. We next use a conventional approach for taking endogeneity into account, namely using instrumental variable regressions. To implement this approach, we use The instrumental variable regression model is estimated with GMM. The IV-GMM estimator is more efficient than the 2SLS estimator when the number of exogenous instrumental variables is more than the number of endogenous variables and thus, the model is overidentified. Tables 5. The Hansen's J statistics for testing the overidentifying restriction has insignificant P-value, indicating that the null hypothesis that the exogenous variables are appropriately independent of the error process cannot be rejected, which is to say the exclusion requirement is met. Both the F-statistics and the Cragg-Donald Wald test used to detect a weak instruments problem indicate that the instruments are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous regressors.
Other examinations for robustness
Finally, alternative measures of pay gap are used to check the robustness of the main results. Three alternative measures of pay gap we explore are: 1) CPS, defined as the slice of CEO total compensation as a percentage of the aggregate total compensation of the top five executives, which is used in Bebchuk et al (2011); 2) the Gini-coefficient of total compensation among the top five executives, which is used in Kale et al (2009 ), Aggarwal et al (2011 , and
Bebchuk et al (2011); 3) the coefficient of variation of the total compensation among the top five executives. The major findings of the study continue to hold under these alternative specifications.
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As further robustness analysis, we delete financial and utility firms, due to their heavy regulatory burden and distinctly different structures of their balance sheets. We also delete firms whose CEO is also a founder, because their incentives may be very different from those of professional managers. Lastly, we exclude firms with negative pay gaps. Again, our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Horizontal Pay Gap
We also look at pay gaps among non-CEO executives. The reason for this procedure is that executives are more likely to compare themselves to other executives with similar positions and status. Hence, non-CEO top executive incentives are more likely to be affected by the compensation of other non-CEO executives. Moreover, a hierarchical structure could well exist among non-CEO executives. These executives may first need to be promoted to a core-executive position, for example holding the COO position, before they can compete for the CEO position.
We define the pay gap among non-CEO executives as the horizontal pay gap, and it is calculated as the dollar difference between the 75 th percentile and the 25 th percentile of total compensation of all non-CEO executives. The distribution of the horizontal pay gaps is reported in the summary statistics of Table 10 . The horizontal pay gap is significantly lower than the pay gap between the CEO and the median non-CEO executive.
Our results using the horizontal pay gap are largely similar to our earlier results using our primary pay gap measure. On average, large horizontal pay gaps significantly increase firm value based on an analysis of the full sample. This effect is significantly reduced as firm R&D intensity and stock return volatility rise, which is largely consistent with our prior findings. The effect of the horizontal pay gap on firm value is greater for large and complex firms, relative to small and single segment firms, but the difference is not statistically significant. The effect of the horizontal pay gap on firm value also falls with the quality of the firm's corporate governance and the median non-CEO executive's equity delta, but again the difference is not statistically significant. This result also holds even if we include the pay gap between the CEO and the median non-CEO executive as an additional control variable. 14 25
Conclusion
We use the often-neglected importance of team production in our empirical study to shed new light on the relationship between pay gap and firm performance. Given that large pay gaps can unintentionally invite value-reducing office politics and non-cooperative behavior by competing managers, we posit a simple principal-agent model that predicts that the pay gap level is determined by the tradeoff between reducing CEO shirking and consumption of private benefits of control and improving team production incentives. Moreover, the relationship between pay gap and firm value also largely depends on a firm's marginal benefit of reducing managerial moral hazard incentives and the marginal cost of inducing non-cooperative manager behavior.
In particular, our analysis highlights that the pay gap decision should be highly firm specific. It is more beneficial in larger, more complex firms and conglomerates, where the marginal productivity of manager effort is higher and hence, a board's main goal is to find ways to induce more managerial effort. The pay gap is lower, when other firm governance mechanisms in place are strong enough to ensure that managerial efforts are close to the firstbest level and consequently making a large pay gap unnecessary. The pay gap level is also related to the likelihood of competing manager sabotage of each other and the potential loss of firm value from sabotage. We find pay gaps to be lower when increasing team production and eliminating non-cooperative managerial behavior is a firm's major concern, such as for high R&D intensity firms with strong corporate governance.
We then test the relationship between firm value and pay gap. This relationship is clearly conditional on firm specific characteristics. We find that the effect of pay gap on improving firm performance is significantly positive when a firm has potentially more manager-shareholder agency problems and the moral hazard problem associated with shirking or excessive perquisite consumption is large. On the other hand, the effect of pay gap on firm performance is largely reduced and can even become negative, when managerial shirking is not a major concern, while improved team collaboration and productivity is a first order of magnitude issue. To be specific, large pay gaps significantly increases firm value in complex firms. Its effect significantly falls and can even become negative when a firm has large R&D investment, or when a firm has high 26 risk, or when senior manager incentives are better aligned with shareholders through either large equity deltas for senior managers or well-constructed corporate governance systems.
Our primary finding is further reinforced by using the 2003 tax reform as a quasi-natural experiment, an event which increases manager after-tax wealth obtained from their equity holdings and lowers the managerial moral hazard problem. We find firms on average reduce their pay gap following this exogenous tax code change. Moreover, the size of the pay gap reduction is heterogeneous across different classes of firms. Also, the marginal effect of pay gap on firm value significantly falls after the tax reform act, suggesting that managerial compensation arrangements that improve firm value are weakened when existing financial incentive mechanisms are reinforced by exogenous external shocks.
Our empirical results help explain the apparently contradictory findings in the existing research that report significant positive and negative relationships between pay gap and firm value. We find that there is no simple relationship between pay gap and firm value across the full sample of publicly listed firms. Instead, we find that the level of pay gap and its effect on firm value depend on firm characteristics and these effects can change over time with major changes in a firm's contracting environment. Thus, no simple rule of thumb exists to determine whether a large or small pay gap is value enhancing for all firms. It follows that pushing pay gap in one direction is likely to benefit some firms, while at the same time harming others. The aggregate shared held by CEO over the total shares outstanding Non-CEO Ownership
The median number of shares held by all non-CEO executives over the total shares outstanding
Firm Characteristic Variables
One-year Adjusted Q Industry adjusted Tobin's Q measured at the end of year t+1 Three-year Adjusted Q Industry adjusted Tobin's Q averaged over year t+1 to t+3 Firm risk
The standard deviation of monthly stock return over the prior five years Governance index score A linear combination of a set of transformed variables that capture the corporate governance mechanisms Diversified A indicator variable which equals one if the firm has more than on business segments Leverage Market Leverage = (debt in current liability + long term debt )/( debt in current liability + long term debt+ market value of equity) Complex Firm Dummy Equals one if the firm's total assets are above sample median and has more than one business segments High-Tech Firm Dummy Equals one if the firm's R&D/ total assets ratio is above 0.04, and zero otherwise High Risk Firm Dummy Equals one if the firm's stock return volatility over the prior five years is above the sample median Strong governance dummy Equals one if the firm's governance index score is above Table 4 . The one-year adjusted Tobin's Q is measured at the end of year t+1, and the three-year adjusted Tobin's Q is the average adjusted Tobin's Q from time t+1 to t+3. All independent variables are measured at the end of year t. The same set of firm level control variables as in Table 5 This table reports the fixed effects OLS regression of firm value on Log (pay gap) and other firm characteristics, and compare the effect of log (pay gap) on firm value before and after 2003 tax cut, conditional on firm type. The one-year adjusted Tobin's Q is measured at the end of year t+1, and the three-year adjusted Tobin's Q is the average adjusted Tobin's Q from time t+1 to t+3. All independent variables are measured at the end of year t. The same set of firm level control variables as in Table 5 is included in the regressions, although they are not reported in order to save space. Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The symbol *** , ** , and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We examine horizontal pay gap in this table. Horizontal pay gap is the dollar difference between the 75th percentile and 25th percentile of the total compensation for all non-CEO executives. Panel A reports the summary statistics of the horizontal pay gap. Panel B reports the regression results of firm 3-year industryadjusted Q on the horizontal pay gap and other control variables. All independent variables are measured at the end of year t. The same set of firm level control variables as in Table 5 is included in the regressions, although they are not reported in order to save space. Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
